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ABSTRACT
Security experts have demonstrated numerous risks imposed by
Internet of Things (IoT) devices on organizations. Due to the wide-
spread adoption of such devices, their diversity, standardization
obstacles, and inherent mobility, organizations require an intel-
ligent mechanism capable of automatically detecting suspicious
IoT devices connected to their networks. In particular, devices not
included in a white list of trustworthy IoT device types (allowed
to be used within the organizational premises) should be detected.
In this research, Random Forest, a supervised machine learning
algorithm, was applied to features extracted from network traffic
data with the aim of accurately identifying IoT device types from
the white list. To train and evaluate multi-class classifiers, we col-
lected and manually labeled network traffic data from 17 distinct
IoT devices, representing nine types of IoT devices. Based on the
classification of 20 consecutive sessions and the use of majority rule,
IoT device types that are not on the white list were correctly de-
tected as unknown in 96% of test cases (on average), and white listed
device types were correctly classified by their actual types in 99%
of cases. Some IoT device types were identified quicker than others
(e.g., sockets and thermostats were successfully detected within
five TCP sessions of connecting to the network). Perfect detection
of unauthorized IoT device types was achieved upon analyzing 110
consecutive sessions; perfect classification of white listed types
required 346 consecutive sessions, 110 of which resulted in 99.49%
accuracy. Further experiments demonstrated the successful appli-
cability of classifiers trained in one location and tested on another.
In addition, a discussion is provided regarding the resilience of our
machine learning-based IoT white listing method to adversarial
attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is globally expanding, providing diverse
benefits in nearly every aspect of our lives [3, 28, 37, 42, 44]. Unfortu-
nately, the IoT is also accompanied by a large number of information
security vulnerabilities and exploits [1, 3, 8, 23, 30, 32, 37, 38, 44].
If we take into account the inherent computational limitations of
IoT devices in addition to their typical vulnerabilities, the ease by
which hackers can locate them (e.g., Shodan [25]), and their ex-
pected proliferation worldwide [17, 34], then both the risks and the
projected global impact of connecting IoT devices to the network
in any modern environment become clearly evident.
The current research focuses on the risks IoT devices pose to
large corporate organizations. IoT security in enterprises is asso-
ciated with the behavior of the organization itself, as well as its
employees. Self-deployed IoT devices may support a variety of
enterprise applications. For instance, smart cameras and smoke
detectors enhance security; smart thermostats, smart light bulbs
and sockets facilitate power savings; and so forth. Given this, care
should be taken to make sure that such Web-enabled devices do not
contribute to an expansion of the cyber attack surface within the
organization. The smart TVs typically installed in conference rooms
are a good example. As described in [9], the Skype app can be used
by a widget in order to obtain elevated privileges. It is then able to
perform rooting, make images of the complete flash memory, and
leak them outside to a remote FTP server. In [6] a "Fake-Offmode" is
outlined, where although the display is switched off, an implanted
malware is still able to capture surrounding voices, and unlawfully
transmit them to third parties via a Wi-Fi connection. Additional
exploits which involve smart TVs are described in [19, 22]. Accord-
ingly, corporate enterprises should reconsider whether to allow
connecting smart TVs to their networks.
Regarding the implications of employee behavior on organiza-
tional IoT security, the rapidly emerging concept of employees
bringing their own IoT devices (BYOIoT) to the workplace also
increases the number of IoT devices connected to enterprise net-
works. As per [35], this trend, which has been growing for several
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years, is associated largely with the use of wearables which have
become popular, particularly in the healthcare and business ser-
vice/consulting industries. Surveying this BYOIoT trend, [13] found
that remote employees tend to connect numerous IoT devices to
their home networks, while 25-50 percent of them admit they have
connected at least one of these IoT devices to their enterprise net-
work as well. The resulting risks outlined, e.g., in [21, 29, 31, 41],
include cross-contamination which can arise when a BYOIoT de-
vice (possibly infected earlier with malware from a domestic net-
work) connects to the organizational network. Scenarios of this kind
which are likely to occur frequently, could serve to unintentionally
inject malware into enterprise networks, or add entry points for
hackers. Once obtaining access, attackers can preserve persistency
in the network, and hide their presence inside the organization for
long periods of time. Full-fledged attacks can then be launched from
the compromised IoT device. Additional negative consequences can
incur in cases in which there is inadequate separation between
production and guest networks, or in cases in which the app of the
BYOIoT device is installed on organizational PCs (possibly asking
for too many permissions).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
outlines the enterprise system we assume, as well as two feasible
IoT attack vectors. Then, Section 3 discusses how automated white
listing of IoT device types can address such attacks and mitigate
their associated risks; this section concludes with an explicit state-
ment of the problem we address. A list of research contributions
is provided in Section 4, followed by a detailed description of the
method we propose in Section 5. Section 6 contains an empirical
evaluation of our method, and the reasons why our method is re-
silient to adversarial attacks. Aspects of deployment are discussed
in Section 7, followed by a review of related work in Section 8. We
then summarize our research in Section 9.
2 SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
In this research, the system we assume is a typical large enter-
prise, facing an ever growing range of IoT-related cyber threats.
Unlike heavy-duty DDoS attacks, carried out by vast botnets (e.g.,
Mirai [30] which exploited weak or default passwords), the cur-
rent research focuses on advanced attacks which are based on
local violations of organizational security policies. Once performed,
they enable an attacker to take advantage of people who connect
unauthorized types of IoT devices to the enterprise network. This
noncompliance with organizational policy could be intentional (e.g.,
a disgruntled employee) or accidental (e.g., an uninformed guest).
Still, it is important to note that in our research scenario the non-
compliant user is unaware of the presence of malware on the IoT
device, and has no intention of compromising the enterprise net-
work. This person is used by an attacker due to the frequent access
he/she provides to the enterprise network. Two associated attack
types can be differentiated as follows:
(1) Untargeted: The connected IoT device has been previously
infected by a malware of indiscriminate nature, virally spread-
ing among as many devices as possible. Cross-contamination
provides a mechanism for this kind of attack.
(2) Specifically targeted: Themalwarewas intentionally implanted
on the IoT device by an attacker, based on the assumption that
the device would likely be connected to a specific organiza-
tional network in the future. Various attacks are possible in
this situation, including a supply chain attack, in which the
IoT device is contaminated before it reaches the end consumer,
e.g., while in manufacturing, distributing, or handling. Another
more focused and precise attack is one in which the attacker
gains control of a specific IoT device belonging to the non-
compliant user, while this user is at home, and uses the IoT
device to infiltrate the organizational network.
Of these two kinds of cyber attacks, we presume that the latter
demands better hacking skills. As such, a skillful attacker might
also be aware of an automated white listing system like the one we
propose in Section 5. This type of attacker might attempt to bypass
it by resorting to adversarial methods. However, as described in
Section 6.5, attacks of this kind on our mechanism are practically
unattainable.
3 WHITE LISTING FOR IOT SECURITY
The cyber attacks discussed in Section 2 are enabled only when
the compromised IoT devices are connected to the organizational
network. For mitigation of associated risks, one option is to inten-
tionally control what connects to the network (i.e., refrain from
connecting device types that are known to have unacceptable vul-
nerabilities). In small offices, composing a list of authorized IoT
device types as an organizational policy is a feasible option. Enforce-
ment of IoT device type white listing is then achievable by means
of employee training, backed by regular physical surveying. In con-
trast to this small-scale environment, large corporate enterprises are
much harder to monitor for unauthorized connected devices. This is
mainly due to the large number of employees and guests, as well as
the size of the physical premises. Thus, non-technical policy-based
solutions will not suffice in large organizations, and advanced auto-
mated means are required. Once deployed, an automated IoT device
type white listing system can feed a SIEM (security information and
event management) system. Subsequently, (near) real-time network
segmentation and access control can be implemented, e.g., by using
software defined networks (SDN). Constant network monitoring
with sufficient resolution may also prove effective in enabling the
investigation of security policy violations, and help to identify the
specific time and place from which an unauthorized IoT device tries
to gain network access.
Note that despite having the same ultimate goal of ensuring
that only authorized IoT devices can connect to the network, in
this study we opt for white, rather than black listing. For certain
use cases, such as email spam filtering, black-listing or even a
combination of black and white listing [15] may be preferable.
However, given the plethora of common IoT vulnerabilities, any
organization wishing to protect its data and IT infrastructure would
be highly suspicious of all types of IoT devices and exhibit great care
before allowing the connection of any IoT device. Consequently, the
white list of authorized device types marked as safe would be much
smaller than the ever growing list of presumably insecure types,
unauthorized by default. As a result, a shorter list may contribute
to the increased efficiency of the machine learning (ML) processes
underlying the proposed white listing method, including model
training, validation, testing, and deployment. Moreover, collecting
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data from authorized IoT device types should be more practical
than unauthorized types, for later comparison against unlabeled
data in production mode. For example, if we don’t let smart TVs
connect to our network, then how can we collect their data to form
the basis of a black list?
Our problem statement is as follows: In order to enforce organiza-
tional security policies regarding the types of IoT devices authorized
to connect to the network, continuous traffic monitoring should
be performed. For each stream of traffic data originating from a
connected device (i.e., an IP stream), the challenge is to accurately
identify the IoT device type. Then, upon determining whether the
IoT device type is authorized (i.e., appears on the white list) or not,
actions may be taken (e.g., disconnect from the network).
4 CONTRIBUTION
In this work we propose a method for identifying unauthorized
types of IoT devices connected to the network, based on the contin-
uous classification of the traffic of individual devices; if the specific
device types do not appear on a white list, they are assumed to be
unauthorized. The contributions of this work are as follows:
(1) Our method only relies on TCP/IP traffic data for classification.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize
network traffic data for ML in order to detect unauthorized IoT
devices connected to a network.
(2) Because it is reliant on Internet traffic data, readily available
to any large organization, our method can be easily deployed
without requiring any costly specialized equipment. It can be
implemented as a software service running in the background,
continuously feeding a SIEM system with alerts about unau-
thorized IoT devices connected to the network.
(3) We implemented the proposed system and demonstrated the
performance of our classifiers using 17 different IoT devices,
representing nine types of devices. Some of these types are
also produced by different vendors, and in some cases we have
used more than one model for a vendor. For example, we have
four distinct devices of the type "watch" in our lab, which are
produced by two vendors: Sony and LG. We have two identical
Urban watches and a single G Watch R watch from LG, and
one Sony watch. Further details can be found in Appendix A.1.
(4) Traffic data was captured over a long period of time, with most
device types accumulating more than 50 recording days (see
Table 1). The devices were located and operated in the most
ordinary manner (e.g., a refrigerator in the kitchen, watches on
the wrists of researchers), and are thus representative of real
world usage.
(5) We showed the ability of our method to effectively classify IoT
device types. IoT device types not included in the white list were
100% correctly detected as "unknown" upon analyzing a moving
window of 110 consecutive sessions. If deployed, our method
can issue an alert to the organizational SIEM, few minutes after
the unauthorized device is connected to the network.
(6) We demonstrate transferability of findings, such that classifiers
learned in one lab reached high classification accuracy when
applied to a set of devices in a second lab located in another
country. This suggests that given the same list of authorized
IoT device types, our method can be used in new settings with
new users and devices without additional training.
(7) Our method is itself resilient to adversarial attacks, and we
provide an explanation for this.
5 PROPOSED METHOD
Given a set of authorized device types D (i.e., the white list) and a
structured set of traffic data, we treat the task of IoT device type
identification as a multi-class classification problem. That is, we
wish to map each IP stream to the type of IoT device that is most
likely to have produced it. We rely on the assumption that every
device type di on the white list D is sufficiently represented in the
(labeled) dataset. This way, a classifier C can be induced by means
of supervised ML, which captures the behavior of every authorized
device type. In turn, this classifier can be continuously applied to
new streams of (unlabeled) traffic data for device type identification
and white listing. An overview of the proposed method for IoT
white listing, from determination of the white list scope to ongoing
application of trained classifier, is portrayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Overview of proposedmethod for IoT white listing
5.1 Notation
The notation we use to describe our method is summarized below.
D: Set {d1, . . . ,dn } of IoT device types that are on the
white list.
DStraininд : Labeled training dataset, used for inducing themulti-
class classifier. It includes feature vectors represent-
ing sessions of devices whose types are in D.
s: Single TCP/IP session, represented by a feature vec-
tor.
C: Multi-class classifier forD, induced fromDStraininд ,
classifies a given session as di or unknown.
tr : Classification threshold for C .
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DSvalidation : Labeled dataset, sorted in chronological order, used
for optimizing classification parameters such as tr .
DSivalidation : Subset of DSvalidation originating from di , repre-
senting an IP stream from that device type.
psi : Posterior probability of a session s to originate from
di ; derived by applying C to session s .
Sd : Sequence of sessions originating from device type
d .
s∗: Smallest sequence of consecutive sessions that if
classified withC and if majority voting is applied on
the classification results, then perfect classification
is achieved.
DStest : Labeled test dataset, sorted temporally, used to eval-
uate the proposed method.
DSitest : Subset of DStest , originating from device type di ,
representing an IP stream from that device type.
5.2 Classifier Training
The Random Forest [10] supervised ML algorithm was selected for
model training. According to a recent survey on ML methods in
cyber security [12], this algorithm which combines decision tree
induction with ensemble learning has several advantages relevant
to our study, including:
• There is no need for prior feature selection (we have over 300
available features).
• It requires just a few input parameters.
• The algorithm is resistant to overfitting.
• When the number of trees increases, the variance is decreased
without resulting in bias (we set the number of trees parameter
to be 500).
The survey cites several interesting studies in which Random Forest
was applied to traffic datasets similar to ours for tasks including
misuse detection from network traffic [18, 43], Command and Con-
trol (C&C) botnet detection from traffic flow-based features [7], and
anomaly detection for threat classification [43].
In our study, Random Forest was applied toDStraininд , to induce
a single session based multi-class classifier C for IoT device types.
When applied to a single session s , classifier C outputs a vector
of posterior probabilities Ps = {ps1 , . . . ,psn }. Each probability psi
denotes the likelihood of the inspected session s to originate from
device type di (
∑n
i=1 p
s
i = 1). We use the threshold parameter tr for
deriving the classification of a single session such that given the
vector of probabilities Ps , if there exists any psi > tr , then session
s is classified as di , which maximizes ps . Otherwise, session s is
classified as ’unknown’. The performance of the trained classifiers
and the most important features they identified are discussed in
Section 6.
5.3 Parameter Tuning
One parameter has been optimized; the classification threshold
denoted as tr is optimized by applying C on DSvalidation and
setting the optimized tr∗ as the one which maximizes the resultant
F-measure (see Equation 1). This metric ranges from 0 (the worst
value for the harmonic mean of precision and recall) to 1 (best value,
attained when both recall and precision are high). This traditional
F-measure, also known as the balanced F -score or F1 score, assumes
equal weight for false positives and false negatives.
F1 = 2 · 11
r ecall +
1
precision
= 2 · precision · recall
precision + recall
(1)
A future modification could be to replace F1 with a more general
Fβ measure (see Equation 2). This way, an organization deploying
our methodology and wishing to enforce a stricter IoT security
policy could choose a β < 1 (e.g., F0.5) to put more emphasis on
precision than on recall. Thus, fewer unauthorized IoTs connected
to the organizational network would be incorrectly identified as
white listed. Other organizations, wishing to reduce false alarms
concerning authorized IoTs, could use a β > 1 (e.g., F2). Note that
the higher tr is, the more confident we wish to be for white listing
the source of a single session s .
Fβ = (1 + β2) ·
precision · recall
(β2 · precision) + recall (2)
5.4 Application for Device Type Identification
In this stage we aim to identify the source of a data stream generated
by an unknown device, denoted by DSitest . Namely, we wish to
classify every IP stream as originating from either an unknown
device type (not on the white list) or from one of the authorized
device types di on the white list. For that, we apply classifier C
on a session s from the stream DSitest and examine the calculated
vector of posterior probabilities Ps . If no psi exists that is greater
than the optimized thresholds tr∗, the single session s is marked
as ’unknown’, as is the entire IP stream. Otherwise, s is mapped to
the corresponding device type di . In Section 6.2 we demonstrate a
second stage that improves IoT device type identification, in which
the procedure described above is repeated for a sequence of sessions,
and a majority vote is taken for final classification.
5.5 Assumptions and Limitations
In addition to assuming that each device type on the white list is
sufficiently represented in DStraininд , our method is also subject
to the following assumptions and limitations:
• Generalization: Although we have presented a comprehensive
and effective methodology (outlined in Figure 1), demonstrating
high performance in our lab, the variety of device types in our lab
is limited. Therefore, while positive, the current results might not
lead to immediate implementation and use with other devices
(i.e., one cannot implement the classifier we trained "as is" for
organizational IoT white listing). Moreover, the contents of the
white list (allowed IoT device types) is likely to vary from one or-
ganization to another, and may also change with time within the
same organization. Thus, for widespread use the methodology
requires customization by the enterprise implementing it.
• Communication technology: We have only investigated de-
vices which communicate via TCP/IP. Other popular IoT-related
protocols such as ZigBee and Bluetooth were not studied. In fu-
ture research we plan to diversify the devices used in our lab and
extend the device type identification and white listing method
to additional communication protocols.
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• Benign data:We assume that the traffic data we collected repre-
sents normal activity, i.e., the devices had not been compromised
or used in an unusual manner. This assumption bolsters the va-
lidity of the classifiers when capturing normal behavior patterns
of diverse IoT device types. In future research we also plan to
examine the traffic data of compromised devices for anomaly
detection and threshold calibration.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Data Collection
Over a period of several months we collected and labeled traffic
data from a variety of IoT devices deployed in our labs (see Table 1
for a summary of the types of devices, and Appendix A.1 for further
details regarding specific devices). The setup of our experiment
reflects a common enterprise practice in which devices are Wi-
Fi connected to several access points wire-connected to a central
switch that, in turn, is connected to a router. Port mirroring is
constantly performed on the switch to sniff the traffic data, which
is then recorded to a local server usingWireshark [14]. The recorded
files are in pcap format and comprised of numerous sessions, each
of which is a set of TCP packets with unique 4-tuples consisting of
source and destination IP addresses and port numbers, from SYN
to FIN. This experimental setup is illustrated in Figure 2. As this
research is performed by teams located in two distant countries, we
took the opportunity to simultaneously deploy the exact same setup
in each of the labs, for later evaluation of model transportability.
Figure 2: Lab setup for IoT traffic data collection
Next, we utilized the feature extractor developed in [5] to con-
vert each session to a feature vector. This tool reconstructs the TCP
sessions from the pcap files and then extracts session level features
from the network, transport, and application layer data. The origi-
nal vector for each session includes 274 features, labeled with the
device type. During data pre-processing we omitted several features
(primarily due to zero variance, irrelevance, or tendency to model
overfitting) and added 60 new features of our own. The list of the
top features ultimately found most influential in IoT device type
white listing can be found in Appendix A.2.
As described in Table 1, we collected a large amount of session
feature vectors from each device in our labs. After merging all of
the feature vectors into a single dataset, we partitioned the data into
three mutually exclusive sets. The first third of the chronologically
earlier sessions captured from each device formed a training set
denoted as DStraininд . The second third formed the validation set
denoted as DSvalidation , and the remaining data makes up the
test dataset denoted as DStest . Partitioning the data was done on a
temporal basis mainly to exemplify a real world scenario, where a
classifier is trained on historical (existing) data, and then tested on
new (emerging) data. Knowing that certain features might change
over time, the temporal partitioning also mitigates overoptimistic
assessment of classifiers’ performance, attained, e.g., in random
sampling or cross-validation.
Table 1: IoT device types used in the experiments
type of device number of
manufacturers
number of
models
number of
labs
number of
devices
number of
client
sessions
number of
recorded
days
baby_monitor 1 1 1 1 51,578 9
motion_sensor 1 1 1 2 3,834 108
refrigerator 1 1 1 1 1,018,921 74
security_camera 2 2 2 3 14,394 70
smoke_detector 1 1 1 1 369 56
socket 1 1 1 2 2,808,876 114
thermostat 1 1 1 1 19,015 52
TV 1 2 2 2 144,205 73
watch 2 3 1 4 4,391 65
6.2 Model Evaluation and Results
For empirical evaluation of our method we conducted nine exper-
iments, corresponding to the nine types of IoT devices available
in our labs. In each experiment, one IoT device type di was left
out of the white list D, to represent an unauthorized type. Then, a
single-session multi-class classifier Ci was trained on a subset of
DStraininд . This subset consisted of IP streams generated by all
other (eight) types, considered to be authorized. As elaborated in
Section 5.3, the classification threshold tr was optimized for F-Score
on DSvalidation , which also did not consist of any session gener-
ated by the unauthorized type. Appendix A.3 exemplifies a ROC
curve for one of the nine experiments, where thermostats were left
out of D (i.e.,not white listed). Finally, the trained classifier Ci was
applied to DStest which consists of all nine IoT device types. Only
then we could examine how accurately Ci can distinguish among
the white listed IoT device types, and how accurately Ci detects
unknown types (not white listed) as such.
Table 2 summarizes the nine experiments described above; in
each experiment a single IoT device type was left out. The table also
presents the optimized threshold tr∗ for the respective classifier.
Note that due to the extreme class imbalance among IoT device
types, evident in Table 1, undersampling was performed to train
classifiers that are less biased by imbalanced class distribution. Ta-
ble 2 also includes the ratio of sessions in DSvalidation which were
generated by devices of the type left out and correctly classified as
unknown, i.e., accurately detected as unauthorized. The rightmost
column in Table 2 determines how accurately each IoT device type
was classified across the eight experiments in which it was con-
sidered authorized (not left out of the white list). For instance, the
second line in this table shows that when smoke detectors were
left out of D to represent an unauthorized device type, and the
respective 123 sessions generated by such devices were filtered out
of DStraininд , the optimized classification threshold was found to
be 0.46. When applied to DSvalidation , the classifier correctly iden-
tified sessions generated by smoke detectors as unknown in 100% of
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cases. In the other eight experiments, when smoke detectors were
white listed, sessions were correctly classified as originating from
smoke detectors in 98% of the sessions, on average.
Table 2: Performance and optimized classification threshold
on the validation set (classification based on a single session)
device type
left out
tr∗ number of
sessions
correctly
detected as
unknown
weighed avg.
correctly classified
when white listed
baby_monitor 0.41 2,000 0.96 0.98
smoke_detector 0.46 123 1 0.98
socket 0.52 2,000 0.97 0.97
TV 0.54 2,000 0.98 0.98
refrigerator 0.54 2,000 0.97 0.97
thermostat 0.55 2,000 0.98 0.97
motion_sensor 0.68 1,277 0.86 0.95
security_camera 0.6 1,432 0.93 0.96
watch 0.84 1,187 0.81 0.93
average 0.94 0.97
standard deviation 0.06 0.02
The results presented in Table 2 demonstrate very high classifi-
cation accuracy; in 94% of cases unknown IoT device types were
detected, and 97% of the white listed devices were correctly classi-
fied by their specific device type (not simply a binary classification
into white listed or not), on average. Despite these high levels of
accuracy in detection, there was some variation noted based on the
type of device; smartwatches and smart motion sensors obtained
only 81 and 86% accuracy in detection as unauthorized, respectively,
in contrast to the 96% or higher accuracy achieved by most other
device types. In order to improve these results, we decided to im-
plement a second stage of classification, which employs majority
voting on a sequence of classified sessions from a given IP stream.
For example, the sequence (watch, watch, TV, watch, socket) would
lead to classifying the IP stream as a watch, due to the majority of
3/5 respective single-session classifications. Although, the sequence
length must be minimized for quicker decisions in real world sce-
narios, care must be taken so that the amount of minimization does
not compromise correct classification. We found that 20 consecu-
tive sessions offer a good trade-off between classification speed and
accuracy. Table 3 shows the performance of the trained classifiers
and the corresponding optimized thresholds; this table differs from
Table 2 in that:
(1) Performance is evaluated on DStest to assess the capability
of classifiers to generalize to unknown data, rather than on
DSvalidation , on which tr was optimized.
(2) Classification of IP streams is evaluated by performing majority
voting on a moving window of 20 consecutive sessions, rather
than single-session classification.
Note that despite the observed decrease in the correct detection
of the IP streams of TVs (when left out / considered unauthorized)
to approximately 84%, the use of majority voting over sequences
of 20 sessions improved the accuracy of detecting unauthorized
devices, as well as classifying authorized devices, for all other types
of devices. With the use of majority voting, the overall average ac-
curacy increased to 96% for unauthorized IoT device type detection,
and 99% for white listed device type classification. Also note that
the results on the test set demonstrate the ability of our method
to identify cross-vendor patterns and characteristics for IoT device
types offered by multiple manufacturers. That is, when the three
security cameras, which represent two manufacturers (see Table 1),
were left outside the white list, they reached detection accuracy
of 94% as unknown types. Appendix A.6 presents nine confusion
matrices (corresponding to the nine experiments we conducted)
obtained on DStest with a moving window of 20 sessions.
Table 3: Performance on the test set (classification based on
a moving window of 20 sessions)
device type
left out
number of
sessions
correctly
detected as
unknown
weighed avg.
correctly classified
when white listed
baby_monitor 1,981 1 1
smoke_detector 104 1 1
socket 1,962 1 1
TV 1,962 0.84 0.98
refrigerator 1,981 0.99 1
thermostat 1,981 1 1
motion_sensor 1,239 1 0.99
security_camera 1,375 0.94 0.99
watch 1,111 0.84 0.97
average 0.96 0.99
standard deviation 0.07 0.01
6.3 Most Important Features
In addition to assessing the overall level of accuracy, we also ex-
plored the features that were ultimately selected by the Random
Forest classifiers from the hundreds of features available. Table 4
presents the three most important features for each of the nine
classifiers in descending order of feature importance. Importance
is defined [33] as the total decrease in node impurity, weighted by
the probability of reaching that node, averaged over all trees of the
ensemble. For example, the first row of Table 4 indicates that the
following features are the most important for correctly classifying
IP streams from eight white listed IoT device types (excluding the
device type of baby monitor which was left out):
(1) ttl_min: TCP packet time-to-live (TTL), minimum (feature im-
portance 0.038)
(2) ttl_firstQ: TCP packet time-to-live, first quartile (0.033)
(3) ttl_avg: TCP packet time-to-live, average (0.025)
As noted by [12], Random Forest implements ensemble learning
(a collection of weak learners), so it suffers from low model inter-
pretability when compared to classical algorithms, such as C4.5
and CART, which produce single decision trees. In other words,
it is harder to determine hierarchies in the structure of inferred
Random Forest classifiers, or even draw explicit classification rules
in such classifiers. Given this, we instead chose to identify the fea-
tures found important by as many experiments as possible, and
explore their discriminative capabilities; in order to accomplish
this we collected the lists of the top-10 features found most impor-
tant by Random Forest in each of the nine experiments. Naturally,
there was only partial overlap among the lists. The table in Ap-
pendix A.2 shows the overlapping portion, comprised of fourteen
features found most important (i.e., among the top-10) in multiple
experiments. Figure 3 illustrates how IoT device type white listing
is affected by two of them:
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Table 4: The top-3 features found most important for de-
tecting unauthorized IoT device types and classifying white
listed IoT device types
device type
left out
feature #1
(most important)
feature #2 feature #3
baby_monitor ttl_min ttl_firstQ ttl_avg
0.038 0.033 0.025
smoke_detector ttl_min ttl_B_min ttl_firstQ
0.046 0.032 0.028
socket ttl_min ttl_B_min ssl_dom_server_name_alexaRank
0.045 0.039 0.026
TV ttl_min ttl_firstQ ttl_avg
0.049 0.033 0.032
refrigerator ttl_min ttl_B_min ttl_firstQ
0.048 0.039 0.034
thermostat ttl_min ttl_B_min ttl_avg
0.044 0.031 0.024
motion_sensor ttl_min ttl_B_min ttl_firstQ
0.048 0.033 0.027
security_camera ttl_min ttl_B_min ttl_firstQ
0.047 0.038 0.034
watch ttl_min ttl_B_min ttl_firstQ
0.039 0.035 0.026
• ttl_B_min: TCP packet time-to-live sent by server, minimum
• bytes_A_B_ratio: Ratio between number of bytes sent and bytes
received
In Appendix A.2 it can be seen that a large portion of the most
important features are TTL-related, and Figure 3a demonstrates
how ttl_B_min behaves differently across the studied IoT device
types, differentiating well between baby monitors, refrigerators,
smoke detectors, and TVs. Figure 3b shows the IoT device types
from another perspective, presenting dissimilar class-conditional
distributions of the ratio between the number of bytes sent and the
number of bytes received, thus promoting accurate classification.
6.4 Transportability of Classifiers
As previously noted, in this study IoT traffic data was collected
simultaneously from two labs located in distant countries, denoted
as Lab A and Lab B. However, despite sharing the same data collec-
tion infrastructure, they were not populated with the same devices.
That is, only two IoT device types were represented in both labs,
namely the TV and security_camera devices; the exact breakdown
is provided in Appendix A.1. It can be seen there that each lab con-
tains one Samsung smart TV, although the models vary between
the two labs. Additionally, in Lab A there are two identical Sim-
pleHome security cameras, and in Lab B there is one Withings
security camera. Using a wide variety of partially matching IoT
device types in the two labs enabled us to assess the transportability
of findings, namely comparing the classifiers’ performance when
trained on data collected from IoT devices in one lab, and tested on
data collected from other IoT devices, operated by other people in
a geographically remote lab.
For example, in the first experiment we left out the TV device
type from D and trained the classifier on Lab A’s data; then we
tested the classifier on Lab B’s data and examined its ability to
detect B’s TV as unknown. In the second experiment, the TV device
type was white listed in A and tested on B’s data to see if it was
classified correctly as a TV. The third and fourth experiments had
the same setup, however the security_camera device type was left
out (and then white listed, respectively) instead of the TV. Note that
due to the limited number of IoT device types used in Lab B, in each
of the four experiments described above, Lab A’s data was used for
training and B’s data was used for testing, without repeating the
experiments in the other direction.
Table 5 presents the classifier transportability results for the four
experiments described above. As can be seen, the average detection
accuracy for the unauthorized TV is 85% when trained on Lab A’s
data and tested on Lab B’s data. This is even slightly better than the
corresponding 84% (see Table 3) obtained based on training the clas-
sifier using all of the data (from both labs). In comparison, complete
transportability (100% accuracy) was achieved when detecting the
unauthorized security camera in Lab B, after it was trained on Lab
A’s data only. This is a surprisingly good result, since the classifier
was trained on two security cameras of the same kind (SimpleHome
XCS7_1001) in Lab A, and testing was performed in Lab B with a
completely different security camera (Withings WBP02_WT9510).
In other words, the trained classifier succeeded in generalizing from
one manufacturer (and model) to another across locations. When
white listed in Lab A, TVs and security cameras were correctly
classified in Lab B to their actual type in 92 and 94% (on average)
of cases respectively. This rate is lower than the corresponding 98
and 99%, which is anticipated in experiments aimed at examining
transportability of classifiers.
Table 5: Transportability of classifiers
device type lab used for
training
lab used for
testing
correctly
detected as
unknown
weighed avg.
correctly classified
when white listed
TV Lab A Lab B 0.85 0.92
security_camera Lab A Lab B 1.00 0.94
6.5 Resilience to Adversarial Attacks
In this work, we explicitly restrict our attack model (as discussed
in Section 2), to people who connect unauthorized IoT devices
to organizational networks, without being aware the devices are
infected with malware. In particular we assume that the attacker
is not purposely altering the traffic of a rogue device in order to
mislead a classification or detection approach in place. However,
the ability of an adversary that is aware of our detection mechanism
to manipulate the traffic in such a way that the traffic of a deviceU
(not on a white list) to look like the traffic of deviceW (on a white
list) must be considered.
Although intuitively this type of attack is possible, given a suf-
ficiently strong and informed attacker that is aware of the imple-
mented classification model and white list, in our opinion, the
amount of effort this would take is not trivial. In principle (and
to some extent, based on Kerkhoff’s principle), such an attacker
may be familiar with the contents of the white list (i.e., what device
types are allowed) and may even be aware of the ranges for the
most important features for a deviceW on the white list. However,
in order to bypass the traffic-based IoT white listing method we
propose, an adversary needs to mimic the traffic of a device on the
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Distribution of important features across IoT types
white list while preserving the intended functionality of the rogue
device.
We note that in many cases IoT devices will contact their manu-
facturer’s website for various reasons (e.g., heartbeat, update check-
ing, services). Thus, an adversary that wants to mimic a device
W must be able to generate similar requests to its manufacturer’s
servers, and more crucially, obtain similar responses. This might
be challenging if the protocol between the device and the manufac-
turer requires reverse engineering or if the manufacturer expects
some form of authentication from the device (for instance by using
public-key cryptography).
It also must be noted that based on the most important features
of our approach for the devices considered in our experiments
(summarized in Table 4), an attacker must be able to mimic the
average speed at which packets travel in a normal connection or the
Alexa Rank of the SSL server used in the connection. Although not
impossible, an attacker must be able to control and fine-tune several
aspects of external servers as well as the respective communication
channel with them, in order to achieve this level of camouflage. This
can be costly and also requires a substantial amount of knowledge,
expertise, and hacking abilities.
In addition, consider the scenario in which an attacker wants
to connect a device to the network that requires relatively high
bandwidth to function, such as smartwatches that broadcast video
over the Internet (which can be used to live-spy on a confidential
meeting, for instance). In this case, if the devices on the white
list do not have a similar bandwidth in normal operation (i.e., a
thermostat), then although an attacker can mimic them, he/she will
have to throttle down or severely compress the data broadcast of
his/her rogue device to avoid suspicion. This might be impossible
(compression) or contradict the attacker’s overall goal (a delay of
throttling might render information out-dated when transmitted
outside the organization).
In summary, although we acknowledge that such attacks are
possible in principle, a detailed investigation regarding the practical
implications of such attacks is left for future work.
7 DEPLOYMENT
The proposed method for IoT device type white listing can be easily
integrated into typical organizational environments. It is particu-
larly well suited for integration with a SIEM software service. In
this case, the detection of an unauthorized IoT device is considered
an event, and the detection of the connection of an unsanctioned
device by the SIEM system can trigger an alarm or the immediate
isolation of the device from the network. As part of such a system
these actions can be followed by a thorough investigation of the
monitored data and the security policy violation.
We implemented the proposed method and assessed the effec-
tiveness of such an implementation in IoT device type white listing.
Figure 4 shows the average number of consecutive sessions (i.e.,
the size of the moving window used for majority voting) required
to reach various levels of classification accuracy. Naturally, the
wider the window, the more accurate classification is, on average.
However, it is evident that the marginal utility of widening the
moving windows diminishes after approximately 20 sessions. This
is true for both correct detection of a device type as unknown and
correct classification of a white listed type to its actual type. More-
over, wider moving windows for higher classification accuracy also
means longer periods of time for an alert to be sent to the SIEM
when a new device connects to the organizational network or is
activated on the organizational premises. This trade-off between
accuracy and speed can be settled by any organization deploying
our method, by setting the parameter of moving window size.
In our experiments, perfect detection of unauthorized IoT de-
vice types was obtained on the test set with a moving window of
110 consecutive sessions (see Appendix A.4). Five of them reached
100% detection accuracy with only 20 (or less) sessions. These en-
couraging results were obtained for TVs (two models of the same
manufacturer), as well as for sockets and motion sensors (each with
two unique devices of the same model), proving model general-
ization across models and specific devices, respectively. For white
listed types perfect classification required a sequence of 346 ses-
sions; however, 110 sessions were enough to obtain 99.49% accuracy.
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For translating between the number of sessions and the respective
amount of time (in seconds), Appendix A.5 summarizes the mean
and standard deviation of the session inter-arrival time for the stud-
ied IoT device types. Note that for each type the time required for
detection is different, since the number of sessions per unit of time
differs among devices, and also varies for the same device over time,
even if a fixed size for a moving window is established. Also note
that for estimation of the time required for detection we omitted
the watches and smoke detectors, because their communication is
stimuli-dependent, thus highly variable.
Figure 4: Classification accuracy on the test set as a function
of the size of the moving window used for majority voting
8 RELATEDWORK
The automated enforcement of an organizational policy of IoT
white listing requires a reliable mechanism for device type iden-
tification, and prior work has attempted to do this. However, as
elaborated in this section, our work addresses a number of sub-
stantial research gaps, since the method we propose is (1) more
practical and easily-deployable than others, (2) less costly, (3) offers
higher discrimination among multiple types, rather than binary
categorization into ,e.g., authorized or unauthorized, (4) generalizes
the trained classifiers for multiple devices per type, multiple models
per manufacturer, and multiple manufacturers per type, (5) enables
continuous verification, (6) is evaluated on large actual datasets
collected from the ordinary and unrestricted daily usage of hetero-
geneous IoT devices, in contrast to simulated, constrained, or very
limited data, and (7) offers robustness and generalization for the
constantly growing IoT domain.
Basing the identification on the device MAC address may not be
effective, since skillful attackers are able to forge the MAC address
of a compromised IoT device [11]. Additionally, although MAC
addresses can be used to identify the manufacturer of a particular
device, there is no established standard to identify a device’s brand
or type based on its MAC address.
Authentication-based methods have also been investigated as
a means of IoT device identification and white listing. This ap-
proach has been studied in [16], in which IoT certificate white
listing was implemented for industrial automation control systems
(IACS). However, as noted by the authors, in this domain equip-
ment is usually engineered such that communication relations are
known up front, thus the overall operational complexity remains
tractable. In contrast, the large-scale enterprise environment we
address (see Section 2) is much more dynamic in nature, where new
types or brands of IoT devices are frequently introduced. Hence,
authentication-based methods will probably fail to scale. In addi-
tion, it cannot be assumed that all vendors implement standardized
encryption protocols, and the feasibility of setting a standard for
global public key infrastructure is limited, so this approach is im-
practical for the problem at hand.
Another method for white listing traffic flows in order to de-
fend against cyber attacks suggested in [4] is more similar to our
approach. However, like [16] (previously mentioned) the authors
admit that in SCADA networks like the ones used in their research,
traffic patterns are somewhat predictable. In contrast, our work
assumes no such predictability and is designed to withstand the
mix of traffic patterns associated with the diverse and evolving IoT
domain. Another gap associated with [4] is that the technique they
suggest only differentiates between authorized and unauthorized
traffic in a binary manner, while the method we propose is also
capable of identifying the specific type of IoT device involved.
The various methods of identifying connected devices proposed
in prior studies have utilized a range of data sources. For example,
researchers suggested a mechanism to identify and verify mobile
devices by extracting features frommeasured signals and emissions,
and classifying them by comparison to a database of labeled clus-
ters [40]. In order to detect specific emitters, they measured various
types of signals and extracted different feature sets, primarily from
radio frequency (RF) transmissions and acoustics. Unfortunately,
as noted by the researchers themselves, these features were occa-
sionally hampered by noise and interference, as well as lost and
false data. Our work differs from theirs in several respects: (1) we
only extract and maintain a single fixed set of networking features,
(2) the features we extract are very hard for adversaries to tamper
with (see Section 6.5), and (3) our features are extracted from traffic
data normally collected by the organization, without the need for a
designated signal recorder, making our method easier to deploy.
In a later work based on RF transmissions ML techniques (kNN
and SVM) were used to leverage minute imperfections of IEEE
802.11 transmissions, and identify the respectivewireless sources [11].
Unlike this work which demonstrated its ability to discern among
identically manufactured network interface cards (NICs), we aim
at correctly identifying various IoT device types, including those
from different vendors. Our method is also free from further limita-
tions imposed by the RF fingerprinting method, such as the need
for mission-specific capturing hardware (vector signal analyzers,
antennas, amplifiers, etc.), as well as physical requirements (e.g.,
the need for the hardware to have a line of sight with the NICs and
be located a maximal distance of 25 meters away from the NICs,
while enduring fluctuations of RF noise conditions).
As opposed to the MAC, authentication, and emission-based
methods outlined above, we propose to use features of network
traffic for IoT device type identification and white listing. Since
traffic data is readily available within any organization, it has been
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used extensively for a variety of security applications in the past.
In many cases, analysis was based on ML, and more specifically
on clustering, classification, and anomaly detection. For example,
in [36] the researchers described a traffic-based technique to identify
rogue wireless access points that attempt to mislead victims into
connecting to them. Other research addressed the challenge of
identifying malware infected clients in a network, as well as the
associated command and control servers [20, 39]. In another study
aimed at detecting malware-related traffic, network traffic features
similar to ours were utilized [5]. Still, despite similarities in data
collection and feature extraction methods, our work focuses on
the identification of IoT device types and white listing them in
organizational settings, rather than on malware detection.
To the best of our knowledge, only a few studies in the literature
were based on research objectives similar to ours. One case [24] dis-
cussed IoT device type-based access control as a keymotivation, like
we do, as well as identity management (IdM) challenges. However,
this research only aims to discern between two types of IoT devices,
namely: expedient (intelligent, high computing power, e.g., sensor
nodes) vs. non-expedient (limited computing power, e.g., passive
tags). Unlike this study, we propose multi-class classification with
much higher resolution (i.e., mapping IoT devices into functional
types, such as smart watches, refrigerators, thermostats, TVs, and
so forth). Moreover, the prior study only suggested a framework
and relied on simulation for proof of concept, while we train and
evaluate our models on a large amount of traffic data collected from
numerous IoT devices.
In another study motivated by network security, genuine traffic
data was collected from several devices and utilized for detecting de-
vice types that have potential security vulnerabilities [27]. However,
in this research only a limited variety of features was extracted;
even more importantly, this study only concentrated on the ini-
tial stage of device setup (when it begins communicating with the
gateway). Our research was not limited in these ways; in addition,
while their data was collected based on repetitive device setups,
specifically dictated by device vendors via the installation guides,
our data was collected over a period of weeks and months and
based on ordinary and unrestricted daily usage in natural surround-
ings (e.g., a smart refrigerator located in the kitchen). This way,
our method enables not only one-time identification, but rather
continuous verification, performed at any stage of device opera-
tion. Consequently, an adversary that somehow manages to bypass
identification during setup is likely to eventually be detected by
our method.
Motivated by privacy issues, the authors of [2] exemplified how
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can analyze traffic data to infer the
type of connected IoT device. However, in comparison to our study,
they analyzed only four device types (one device per type and one
manufacturer per type). Moreover, three out of the four devices are
purpose-limited, steady, and rather "predictable" in terms of traffic
(socket, camera, and sleeping monitor). They also evaluated their
method on data collected over just several hours, with repetitious
scenarios and stimuli. Another limitation for scaling this method
is their reliance on a single feature, which is the domain of DNS
queries. Although we have such data, we refrain from using it in
order to mitigate concerns about model overfitting.
In [26] the authors presented data collection and analytical tech-
niques that partially overlap with the current work, with IoT device
identification set as the research objective. In comparison to this
work, in our study (1) identification is leveraged for white listing
in large-scale enterprises, (2) much more traffic data was collected,
contributing to the trained models’ robustness, (3) multiple vendors
per device type are monitored to look for cross-vendor patterns and
characteristics of a given IoT device type, (4) multi-class classifica-
tion is applied, as opposed to binary classification, and (5) model
transportability between distant labs is tested. We are not aware of
any other study which successfully addresses all these challenges.
9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This research demonstrated how supervised ML can be applied to
analyze network traffic data in order to accurately detect unautho-
rized IoT devices. To train and evaluate a multi-class classifier, we
collected and manually labeled network traffic data from seventeen
IoT devices representing nine device types; in order to assess the
ability of our method to detect a variety of unauthorized IoT device
types, we trained a multi-class classifier for each device type on the
remaining eight device types, and examined its ability to correctly
detect the ninth type as unknown and classify the other eight as
belonging to a specific type on the white list. Throughout the paper,
we demonstrated the effectiveness of our method in terms of the
following:
• Classification accuracy: The trained classifiers achieved 96%
accuracy (on average) in the detection of unauthorized IoT de-
vice types on a test set, by performing majority voting over the
classifications of no more than 20 consecutive sessions. Actually,
six out of the nine unauthorized device types attained 99-100%
detection accuracy. At the same time, white listed IoT device
types were classified to their specific types with near perfect
average accuracy of 99%.
• Detection speed: On a test set, the classifiers managed to detect
unauthorized IoT devices perfectly based on the analysis of 110
consecutive sessions. A sequence of five sessions was enough
for sockets and thermostats. The translation from the number
of sessions to time (in seconds) varies across the device types
studied.
• Classifiers’ transportability: Our method also demonstrated
good transportability, by training classifiers on data collected in
one lab and testing on data collected in another lab located in a
different country. Classification accuracy obtained was high, at
levels similar to the accuracy obtained when training and testing
were performed on all of the data.
• Resilience to cyber attacks: Although theoretic rather than ex-
perimental, we analyzed and showed how our method is resilient
in the face of attempted adversarial attacks.
In future research we plan to analyze a broader collection of IoT
device types, explore additional communication technologies, and
experiment with the data of IoT devices infected by cyber attacks
and malware.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 IoT Devices Used in Experiments
device # type of device manufacturer model lab number of
client
sessions
number of
server
sessions
number of
recorded
days
1 baby_monitor Beseye Baby_Monitor_Pro A 51,578 - 9
2 motion_sensor D_Link DCH_S150 A 1,199 - 55
3 motion_sensor D_Link DCH_S150 A 2,635 7,926 53
4 refrigerator Samsung RF30HSMRTSL A 1,018,921 2,378 74
5 security_camera Simple_Home XCS7_1001 A 4,561 - 8
6 security_camera Simple_Home XCS7_1001 A 300 7,903 47
7 security_camera Withings WBP02_WT9510 B 9,533 - 15
8 smoke_detector Nest Nest_Protect A 369 - 56
9 socket Simple_Home XWS7_1001 A 1,309,849 251,401 53
10 socket Simple_Home XWS7_1001 A 1,499,027 287,275 61
11 thermostat Nest Learning_Ther._3 A 19,015 - 52
12 TV Samsung UA40H6300AR A 135,035 5,143 58
13 TV Samsung UA55J5500AKXXS B 9,170 - 15
14 watch LG G_Watch_R A 2,327 - 11
15 watch LG Urban A 1,090 - 34
16 watch LG Urban A 343 - 5
17 watch Sony SmartWatch_3_SWR50 A 631 - 15
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A.2 Features Found to be Important for IoT
Device White Listing at Least Twice
feature brief description occurrences
in top-10
average
importance
ttl_min TCP packet time-to-live, minimum 9 0.045
ttl_B_min TCP packet time-to-live sent by server, minimum 9 0.033
ttl_firstQ TCP packet time-to-live, quartile 1 9 0.029
ttl_avg TCP packet time-to-live, average 8 0.024
ttl_B_thirdQ TCP packet time-to-live sent by server, quartile 3 8 0.021
ttl_B_median TCP packet time-to-live sent by server, median 7 0.02
ttl_B_firstQ TCP packet time-to-live sent by server, quartile 1 7 0.02
ssl_dom_server
_name_alexaRank Alexa Rank of dominated SSL server 6 0.021
bytes_A_B_ratio Ratio between number of bytes sent and received 6 0.019
reset Total packets with RST flag 4 0.019
http_dom_host
_alexaRank Dominated host Alexa rank 4 0.018
ttl_thirdQ TCP packet time-to-live, quartile 3 3 0.019
ttl_max TCP packet time-to-live, maximum 3 0.017
ttl_B_var TCP packet time-to-live sent by server, variance 2 0.017
A.3 ROC for the Classifier Trained Without
Thermostats
A.4 Number of Consecutive Sessions Needed
for Varying Levels of Correct Detection as
Unknown across IoT Device Types
(Communicating Regardless of Stimuli)
number of
consecutive
sessions
baby_
monitor
socket TV refrigerator thermostat motion_
sensor
security_
camera
1 0.959 0.968 0.9825 0.9675 0.98 0.862176977 0.930167598
5 0.963426854 1 0.994477912 0.986472946 1 0.970843184 0.949295775
10 0.965344048 1 0.99394551 0.991963837 1 0.996822875 0.945907473
15 0.96978852 1 0.997464503 0.995971803 1 1 0.943165468
20 0.973750631 1 1 1 1 1 0.941090909
25 0.977226721 1 1 1 1 1 0.944117647
30 0.977676306 1 1 1 1 1 0.947211896
35 0.978128179 1 1 1 1 1 0.95037594
40 0.976032636 1 1 1 1 1 0.953612167
45 0.974437628 1 1 1 1 1 0.956923077
50 0.973859559 1 1 1 1 1 0.960311284
55 0.974306269 1 1 1 1 1 0.963779528
60 0.975785677 1 1 1 1 1 0.967330677
65 0.976239669 1 1 1 1 1 0.970967742
70 0.977213879 1 1 1 1 1 0.974693878
75 0.978193146 1 1 1 1 1 0.978512397
80 0.980739198 1 1 1 1 1 0.982426778
85 0.986951983 1 1 1 1 1 0.986440678
90 0.989010989 1 1 1 1 1 0.99055794
95 0.991080797 1 1 1 1 1 0.994782609
100 0.991583377 1 1 1 1 1 0.999118943
105 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999111111
110 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
115 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
120 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A.5 Distribution of Session Inter-Arrival Times
on the Test Set across IoT Device Types
(Communicating Regardless of Stimuli)
type of device mean of
session inter-arrival time
standard deviation of
session inter-arrival time
refrigerator 0 days 00:00:11.784784 0 days 00:00:03.316659
socket 0 days 00:00:04.634451 0 days 00:00:03.408049
TV 0 days 00:00:58.148296 0 days 00:02:23.671879
thermostat 0 days 00:00:09.359719 0 days 00:00:17.572645
motion_sensor 0 days 00:04:08.519480 0 days 00:10:14.900034
baby_monitor 0 days 00:00:01.135635 0 days 00:00:01.287092
security_camera 0 days 00:01:17.907303 0 days 00:01:55.050973
A.6 Confusion Matrices on DStest Based on a
Moving Window of 20 Sessions
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actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 1111 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 0 1
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - baby_monitor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 1
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 - baby_monitor 0 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 0 1111 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 0 1
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - smoke_detector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 104 1
actual IoT device type \ classified as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
1 - TV 1954 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0.99
2 - baby_monitor 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 1109 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.99
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 0 1
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - socket 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1962 1
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 - baby_monitor 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 1111 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 0 1
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - TV 0 0 304 0 0 0 1 0 1657 0.84
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1954 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0.99
2 - baby_monitor 0 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 0 1111 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 1
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - refrigerator 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 1959 0.99
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 - baby_monitor 0 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 0 1107 0 0 0 0 4 0.99
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 1
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1907 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0.97
2 - baby_monitor 0 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 0 1064 0 0 0 0 47 0.95
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 1
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 1375 0 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1954 0 27 0.99
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1239 1
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1937 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0.99
2 - baby_monitor 0 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 - watch 0 0 0 1097 0 0 0 0 14 0.99
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 0 1239 0 0 0 1
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1979 0 2 0.99
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 77 0 0 1298 0.94
actual IoT device type \ classified as 0 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 Unknown Accuracy
0 - socket 1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 - TV 0 1889 0 0 0 0 0 0 73 0.96
2 - baby_monitor 0 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 - smoke_detector 0 0 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 - motion_sensor 0 0 0 0 1173 0 0 0 66 0.95
6 - security_camera 0 0 0 0 0 1335 0 0 40 0.97
7 - refrigerator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1945 0 36 0.98
8 - thermostat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 1
Unknown - watch 0 179 0 0 0 0 0 0 932 0.8413
